This article challenges a key part of the conventional view of coalitions in presidential systems that sees them as short-lived and ad hoc. I show instead that there is wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across these regimes and, consequently, in the role of coalition-building in policymaking. I develop a theory of the incentives of parties to participate in the government and the circumstances under which we might expect to see the existing governing coalition to break down. I draw on data from 64 presidential administrations in 12 Latin American countries between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy-making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government. In particular, I show that strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties; in contrast, effective legislatures and high rates of approval for the executive contribute significantly to more stable governments.
In recent years, work done by a number of scholars has established that coalitions are common in presidential systems and that they are a central piece in presidents' policy-making strategy. This work has challenged the traditional view that the lack of incentives for coalitionbuilding condemned minority presidents to deadlock and conflict, and made presidential systems more prone to breakdown than parliamentary systems.
1 Instead, the literature on comparative political institutions has moved away from broad comparisons across regime types to study the circumstances under which presidential coalitions form (Cheibub et al 2004, Aleman and Tsebelis 2008) and their importance for governance (Amorim Neto 2006) .
In this paper I challenge a key remaining part of the conventional view of coalitions which sees them as short-lived and ad hoc. I show that in spite of the alleged instability of coalition governments, there is in fact wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across presidential systems and, consequently, in the role of coalition-building in policymaking in these systems. In some countries, like Brazil, coalitions are indeed short-lived and presidents must frequently reconfigure their governing coalition in order to maintain enough support to enact their agenda. Under these circumstances, governing might become very costly indeed as presidents compromise on policy, sacrifice positions in the government or use government funds to secure the legislative support needed to pass policy (Kellam 2007 , Zucco 2007 . But in other countries like Uruguay or Chile, coalitions are relatively stable and they provide presidents with reliable legislative support throughout their term. What explains this variation? When can we expect political parties to act as reliable coalition partners in presidentialism and when should we expect endemic instability in coalition building?
To answer these questions, I draw on the literature on government formation and duration in parliamentarism, as well as previous work on coalition politics in presidential systems, to develop a theory about the incentives of parties to participate in the government. I argue that despite fixed terms, we observe a clear dynamic where parties bargain with the president over policy and positions. The terms of this bargain, and the changing conditions that might alter the initial agreement, systematically affect the incentives of political actors to maintain or end the governing coalition and thus explain the variability we observe in coalition stability among presidential systems. I draw on data from 64 presidential administrations in 12 Latin American countries between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy-making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government. In particular, I show that the stability of presidential coalitions relies crucially on the balance of institutional and political power between the president and the legislature. Strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties; in contrast, effective legislatures contribute significantly to more stable governments.
I proceed as follows. The first section describes variation in coalition duration across Latin American countries. The second section presents theoretical arguments about how this variation is related to bargaining between the president and other parties, and the circumstances under which we are likely to see this bargaining lead to defections. The third section introduces the dataset on government formation in Latin America, and describes the variables as well as the method used in the empirical analysis. The results are presented in the fourth section and the fifth section concludes.
The Problem: Variation in Coalition Duration
Critics of presidentialism long held that coalitions should be rare in presidential systems where fixed terms allow presidents without majority support in the legislature to govern on their own. However, although they do not need to form coalitions to survive, presidents still have incentives to include other parties in the cabinet in order to assure a smooth passage of their political agenda through congress (Martinez-Gallardo 2008 , Amorim Neto 2006 , as well as to move future policy closer to their own preferences (Cheibub and Limongi 2002) . In fact, more than half of all governments formed in the presidential regimes of Latin America are coalitions (Deheza 1998 , Chasquetti 2001 ) and most of these are formed when the president's party does not hold a majority of seats in the legislature and thus has to cross party lines to search support to implement the government's agenda.
2
Whenever executive coalitions did form, critics of presidentialism typically countered that they would tend to be unstable because fixed terms would give coalition partners incentives to defect as elections approached, and lax party discipline meant that individual legislators were not bound to support the government, even if they were part of it (Mainwaring 1993 The first columns provide data on the duration of 122 cabinets, including single-as well as multiple-party governments. The duration of a cabinet is determined by a change in the partisan configuration of the cabinet or by the inauguration of a new president. On average, presidential cabinets last around 29 months, which is close to the 25 months on average that parliamentary systems last (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2004) . But the table shows wide variation across countries. On one extreme, in Peru and Brazil, where presidential terms are 4 years, cabinets last around a year on average as minority presidents struggle to muster the support they need to govern effectively. By contrast, on the other extreme, cabinets in Paraguay and Chile last on average more than three times as much as they do in Peru or Brazil although the president's term is only slightly longer (5 and 6 years, respectively). In Mexico and Costa Rica, where single-party governments are the norm, cabinets tend to last the full length of the presidential term: 6 and 4 years, respectively. ** Table 1 here**
To show the variation in the length of coalition governments in particular, the right-hand side of Table 1 separates single-and multi-party cabinets. The data show that coalition cabinets are in fact common in Latin America and that they do indeed tend to last less on average than do singleparty governments. This is not surprising and parallels patterns of cabinet duration in parliamentary governments where coalitions are also shorter-lived than their single-party counterparts (Budge and Keman 1990) . However, the table also shows that there is great variation in the stability of coalition governments across the region. Again, Brazil and Peru, as well as Ecuador, conform closely to the view of executive coalitions in presidential regimes as unstable, but this is not the case in other countries like Venezuela, Uruguay or Chile, where coalitions are often formed and have tended to provide stable support to presidents as they seek to implement their policy agenda.
In the rest of the article I explain this variation by relating it to the conditions under which the president and other political parties bargain over policies and government positions.
The Explanation: Inter-party Bargaining and Cabinet Duration in Presidential Regimes
In this section, I develop a theory of the factors that shape the stability of the governing coalition in presidential systems. I begin by describing the basic model of coalition formation used in the literature on parliamentary cabinets. Next, I explain how differences between presidential and parliamentary politics shape coalition dynamics, focusing specifically on the powers of the president, the incentives of political parties and the nature of the bargaining environment.
A large number of scholars of parliamentary regimes have explored the features that make parliamentary governments more or less stable. 4 Much of this literature has concentrated on modeling the underlying process that leads to the collapse of parliamentary governments and on uncovering the structural factors that increase the likelihood that a cabinet will fall. The basic model that has been used to study cabinet duration treats government formation as an efficient bargaining process between political parties that culminates in the formation of an equilibrium government.
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Subsequent to the formation of the government, the original agreement is then put under stress by changes in the political environment that alter the distribution of power among political parties, disrupting the equilibrium and forcing a re-negotiation of the terms of the bargain (see Diermeier 2006) . Whether this process will result in a cabinet failure depends, in turn, on the relative payoff to coalition partners of staying in the government or leaving, as well as the complexity of the environment in which coalition bargaining takes place.
This basic model is a useful starting off point for thinking about government defections in presidential systems but a number of important modifications are needed to take into account differences between parliamentary and presidential systems. 6 As in parliamentary systems, we can characterize the process of government formation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a formateur and other parties in the legislature. In presidential regimes, however, the president can decide with few restrictions whether she includes other parties in the cabinet or not, regardless of the legislative status of her party. 7 In practice, this means that the president is always the formateur or first-mover in government formation and that any government must include the president's party.
An important implication of this is that the number of possible coalitions that can be formed is limited to those that include the president's party, potentially giving the president's party influence beyond its size and importance (Cheibub and Limongi 2002) .
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Hence, we can think of the government formation process as starting with a decision by the president of whether or not to invite other parties to join the cabinet. Although presidents are not required to maintain the support of a legislative majority, the need to get their policy agenda approved by a legislative majority gives them strong incentives to include parties in the government, especially if their own party has weak legislative support. Governments, then, might include only the president's party-if, for example, the president has a secure legislative majority and decides not to exchange portfolios for future support or if opposition parties calculate that they stand to gain more electorally if they oppose the government than if they join it. But they may also include parties other than the president's. In this case, the president will offer a combination of portfolios and policies to potential coalition partners, who in turn will consider whether to accept the president's offer and join the government or not. If no party accepts the offer, the process ends and the president's party governs alone. This reversion point is different to parliamentary 6 The classic treatment of the differences between presidential and parliamentary political systems is Linz (1994) . See also Mainwaring (1993) , Stepan and Skach (1993) , , and Cheibub and Limongi (2002) . 7 In some presidential systems certain appointments require congressional approval. 8 Cheibub and Limongi (2002) show, however, that the probability that the president's party will also be the largest party is nearly .95, and that this probability is practically identical in parliamentary systems.
governments, where a new attempt is made to form a government until there is no majority that can reject its investiture (Cheibub et al 2004) . If one or more parties agree to join the government, a coalition will be formed, sometimes adding enough legislative representation to form a majority government coalition but sometimes falling short of majority status (minority coalition).
As in parliamentary regimes, the resulting government can be thought of as a bargaining equilibrium: a combination of portfolio allocations and of legislative representation that results from the president's anticipation of challenges she will face during her term and of the configuration she anticipates will allow the most efficient bargaining with the legislature in order to achieve the government's goals (Amorim Neto 2006 , Martinez Gallardo 2008 . As we will see, the equilibrium government that will form will depend too on the perceived benefits that potential coalition partners might associate with joining the government.
Once a government is formed, unexpected changes to the deal struck at the beginning of the presidential term change the president's calculations about the cost of exchanging cabinet positions for legislative support. Such changes also may affect the calculation of parties regarding the benefit of being in the government. These events might include a midterm election that changes the relative legislative weight of government parties, or shifts in the political or economic context that change the public's perception of the government or that force the government to take action in some policy area. 9 Depending on the circumstances, there are two possible outcomes. Given the substantial benefits of being in office, party leaders will often find it beneficial to compromise and renegotiate the existing deal by changing the distribution of ministerial positions or compromising on policy (Laver 2003) . However, sometimes the political costs of staying in government will outweigh the benefits and no acceptable compromise can be struck between the existing government partners. In these cases, bargaining will fail and one or more parties will defect from the government.
When are we more likely to see bargaining failures?
In the rest of the article I argue that the success or failure of bargaining within the governing coalition will depend crucially on the relative importance to the president of legislative support from outside her party. All else equal, strong presidents have fewer incentives to compromise with other parties in exchange for legislative support and so we should observe coalition instability where political or institutional conditions enhance a president's authority vis-a-vis other political institutions. However, the relationship is not all one-way. Despite the centrality of presidents in government formation and change in presidential systems, patterns of coalition stability also depend on two other factors; coalition partners' perceived risk from being associated with a weak government and the bargaining environment, which determines the costs of reaching agreements. I will deal with each one of these elements in turn.
The incentives of presidents
Confronted with a potential bargaining failure, presidents must decide whether to compromise in order to strike a new equilibrium or whether to dissolve the current coalition and build a new one. Presidents who place higher value in enlisting the support of other parties in order to build legislative majorities are more likely to seek a compromise by, for example, reshuffling the cabinet in a way that reflects the new balance of power or by offering changes in policy to coalition partners (Diermeier and Merlo 2000) . In turn, the value to presidents of coalition building will depend largely on their political and institutional leverage. Two factors, the legislative support for the president's party and the extent of the president's institutional authority, are likely to play a large role in determining the extent to which the president has to rely on the legislative process in the implementation of her policy agenda.
The first measure of a president's strength comes from the strength of the government's legislative support. The association between the government's numerical status and its durability has been long established in studies of parliamentary government, where majority governments are consistently found to last longer than minority governments (Warwick 1992 , King et al 1990 , Diermeier and Stevenson 2000 . In presidential systems, however, the government cannot be defeated by a parliamentary vote, which means that cabinet terminations in single-party presidential cabinets happen only if the president resigns or is removed by extraordinary means, regardless of whether the government has majority status or not. 10 Hence, single-party majority or minority cabinets should be substantially more stable than governments involving more than one party.
Among coalition governments, presidents should face the lowest potential costs if the coalition splits if the government they have formed is surplus coalition, that is, if government's majority in the legislature is large enough that any party can defect without jeopardizing the government's majority. Thus, we should expect presidents leading surplus coalitions to be less willing to strike a new bargain with their coalition partners and the coalition governments that they form to be less durable than other coalitions. By contrast, the highest potential costs if the coalition splits should be faced by minority presidents who have formed minimum winning coalitions
, that is, cabinets where the government controls a legislative majority but where the exclusion of any one party would leave the government without a parliamentary majority.
Presidents leading MWC should be more willing to strike a new bargain with their coalition partners and their governments should be more durable. In the case of minority coalitions, although 10 Single-party governments should also face lower transaction costs as we will see below.
the president might want to hold on to the support of coalition partners, no party is pivotal in maintaining a legislative majority and so the cost of a defection is also relatively low.
A second measure of presidential strength comes from their institutional leverage. Presidents with strong legislative powers, especially those who have the authority to act unilaterally to change policy, should also be less likely to compromise in order to preserve the coalition. For example, some presidential systems give the executive the authority to change policy unilaterally through the use of executive decrees. In these cases we should expect presidents to value coalition building less and to be less willing to pay the price of maintaining the coalition in the face of changing circumstances. In contrast, where the president's ability to change policy relies necessarily on the concurrence of a legislative majority, the president will be more likely to compromise with other parties and to pay a higher price to maintain the support of other political parties.
The institutional features of the presidency are counterbalanced by the legislature's capacity to effectively revise or modify the executive's proposals. Where strong legislative institutions allow political parties to scrutinize and revise the executive's proposals, we should expect the president to place a higher value on building and maintaining legislative support and thus we should observe more stable cabinets. Martin and Vanberg (forthcoming) find, for example, that strong committee systems in parliament allow coalition partners to closely monitor the government's proposals and revise them when they stray too far from their preferences. By contrast, if the legislature is not an effective counterbalance to the president's authority-if it does not have the authority to revise, amend or block the president's proposals-we should expect the president to value coalition building less and thus coalitions to be more unstable.
The incentives of parties
The potential costs and benefits to political parties of staying in the government also shape patterns of cabinet duration. In parliamentary systems a bargaining failure might lead to a government termination so parties must consider the possibility of an early election in calculating the cost of leaving the government. By contrast, in presidential regimes if a coalition party leaves the government the vacated portfolios revert to the president who can re-distribute them at will among the remaining parties or offer them to a new party (Cheibub and Limongi 2002) . As a result, the reversion point for parties leaving the cabinet is not an early election (and with it the possibility of participating in a new government), but rather joining the ranks of the opposition until the next scheduled election.
Bargaining failures, then, should prompt parties to weigh the benefits of being in office with the prospect of shoring up support for the party by distancing itself from the government.
Government portfolios are valued by potential coalition partners as a privileged channel to policymaking, as well as a way to access the perks of office, including a source of patronage for their members and a vehicle through which to distribute pork to their supporters Limongi 2000, Araujo, Pereira and Raile 2008) . The value of a portfolio is even higher in presidential systems where opportunities for pork and policy are concentrated in the executive and opportunities for career advancement outside the government are scarce.
But parties also care about their electoral fate and so the potential electoral cost or benefit of being associated with the government will play a large role in their decision about whether to stay in the government or not (Strom 1990) . Most obviously, parties will take into account the electoral risk of being associated with a president who is unpopular among voters. All else equal, parties are less likely to defect from the government when the president has widespread support from voters and they calculate that the executive's popularity might benefit them at the polls. In the case of Uruguay, for example, Altman (2000) finds evidence that factions within the ruling party are more likely to defect from the government when the president's popularity falls. We should expect to find a similar pattern across presidential systems.
The bargaining environment
Interactions between the president and political parties do not happen in a vacuum; some central features of the political environment in which their negotiations take place are bound to affect government stability. In general, where the costs of reaching agreement are low we should be less likely to see bargaining failures that lead to the dissolution of the governing coalition. Two key factors shape the nature of negotiations: the number of parties involved in bargaining and the affinity of their interests. In the cabinet, agreement should be easiest in single-party governments where transaction costs are lower than in coalition governments. Likewise, coalitions that are ideologically compact-that is, ones in which parties have higher agreement on policy-should have to pay lower transaction costs when negotiating over policy and, thus, should be more stable.
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The ease of reaching agreements among political parties in the legislature should be shaped by characteristics of the party system. In the parliamentary literature, legislative fractionalization has been associated with shorter cabinet duration, though the reasons are disputed (see Grofman and Van Roozendaal 1997) . Some argue that fractionalized legislatures measure the likelihood that minor external shocks might change the balance of power within the legislature and make parties more likely to seek an alternative coalition (ex. King et al. 1990, Laver and Schofield 1990) . In presidential systems, however, no alternative coalition that excludes the president's party can replace the governing coalition. In this context the effect of fractionalization is unclear; it might make the cost of defections lower for the president who might have more alternative coalition partners, but it cannot lead to the replacement of the cabinet by an alternative government.
Warwick (1992) suggests a different possibility. He argues that in fractionalized party systems the need to include more parties in the government can also introduce a higher degree of ideological diversity and, thus, higher transaction costs, into the government. In his account the effect of party system characteristics on duration is indirect: more fractionalized legislatures should be associated with coalition governments, as well as with larger and more ideologically diverse coalitions. Evidence from Latin American presidential systems does indicate that higher fractionalization is indeed associated with the inclusion of more parties in the government. 12 I will return to this issue in the empirical tests below.
Finally, agreement within political parties should also shape bargaining between parties. In general, where party discipline is lax presidents will favor building ad hoc legislative coalitions by bargaining with individual legislators instead of creating executive coalitions that entail giving up cabinet positions (Kellam 2007) . The extent to which party members have incentives to vote as a united block will determine to a large extent the cost to presidents of forming supportive legislative coalitions. In the context of highly disciplined parties presidents will find it harder to build coalitions on a case-by-case basis and will likely place a higher value on the formation of formal executive coalitions. Consequently, we should expect high levels of party discipline to be associated with cabinet stability. 
Dependent Variable: Cabinet Dissolutions
The arguments I have outlined are about the conditions that make it more likely that interparty bargaining failures will lead to cabinet dissolutions and force the president to negotiate a new bargaining equilibrium. The dependent variable is the time that elapses between the formation of a cabinet and a change in the partisan composition of the government. A cabinet starts when one of two things happen: 1) a new president is inaugurated, through an election typically, regardless of whether the party in government changes, and/or 2) the partisan configuration of the government changes. 14 A defection happens when a party other than the president's loses its representation in the cabinet, typically through the resignation of one or more cabinet ministers. The vacated position can be filled by a member of one of the governing parties but it might be given instead to a member of a new party. 13 Cabinets that last less than a month are excluded from the analysis. See fn. 3 for list of counties and years covered. Defections are not the only way in which cabinets are dissolved, however. Some cabinets end when the president steps down after an election (or the death/illness of an incumbent). Because elections in presidential systems are constitutionally mandated and fixed, these cabinet failures can be considered as exogenous to the process of interparty bargaining. In these cases, the duration of the cabinet does not tell us much since governments that could have potentially lasted longer end prematurely when their fixed term expires and an election ushers in a new president. In other cases no party leaves the government but, instead, the government is expanded to include a new party.
Although some of the arguments that I have proposed here should apply to these terminations (especially the importance for government formation of having sufficient legislative support), these additions are not likely to result from the type of bargaining failure that I discuss in this paper.
Figure 2 presents data on the 122 cabinets included in the dataset and the proportion that ended in each of the ways outlined above: because a party left the government, through a scheduled election, or because a party joined it. Bargaining failures were the reason for termination in 37 percent of all cabinets. In fact, in three countries-Brazil, Uruguay and Peru-cabinets were more likely to end because of a defection than an election and in Ecuador they were equally likely to end in either of the two ways. 15 Elections account for 48% of terminations and expansions of the cabinet account for 12%. Of the 63 cabinets in the dataset that did not end in an election, 71% ended with a party defection and the re-negotiation of the governing bargain.
**Figure 2 here**

Method
To model the conditions under which inter-party bargaining leads to cabinet failures I use duration analysis. Duration analysis has been widely used in the literature on cabinet duration in parliamentary regimes because it is particularly well-suited to explore the effect of a set of independent variables on the hazard rate, or the likelihood that a subject will fail given that it has not failed until that moment (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In this case the subject of interest is a cabinet and duration analysis allows us to estimate the effect of presidential strength, the calculations of opposition parties and the bargaining environment on the likelihood that a cabinet will end with a defection (a cabinet failure) given that it has survived thus far.
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Further, duration analysis is attractive for the study of cabinet failures in presidential systems because it accounts for censoring or the possibility that certain observations (cabinets) leave the dataset (or fail) due to factors that are theoretically irrelevant or exogenous to the process of inter-party bargaining that I detail here. In what follows I concentrate on terminations caused by a party defection and consider cabinets that ended through a presidential election or cabinet expansion to be censored. 17 I also account for the possibility that observations within a country are not independent by correcting for possible intra-group correlation in the standard errors.
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Duration analysis also allows the researcher to implicitly model how the risk of failure (or hazard rate) changes over time. Although it is likely that parties would face stronger incentives to defect as the next election approaches, and thus that we would see rising hazards, the theory suggests that the incentives of parties to position themselves before an election should be conditional on changing conditions, especially the president's political and institutional strength.
Moreover, there is no reason to expect that challenges to the existing government that might prompt a re-evaluation of the terms of the government bargain will increase or decrease in time. 19 In the 16 The specific form of the models estimated is the following: h(t) = exp(β'x)h 0 (t) where h(t) is the hazard rate, h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard, and x is a matrix of independent variables with their estimated coefficients β. 17 King et al. (1990) introduced this approach See also Diermeier and Stevenson (2000) . 18 The appendix presents results with clustering on presidential administration, rather than country. The substantive results are unchanged. 19 See discussion in Browne et al (1984) .
absence of a clear a priori reason to expect that the hazard will follow any specific distribution, the most appropriate model is a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model which makes the least restrictive assumptions about the shape of time dependency.20
Independent Variables
The central hypothesis derived from the theory is that the potential costs to presidents of including other parties in their government significantly shape cabinet stability. These costs, I have argued, should vary with the extent of legislative support for the president's party and the president's institutional leverage.
Legislative support is measured using a set of dummies that code whether the president's party holds a majority of seats in the legislature, whether the government is a coalition and, if so, whether the governing coalition holds a majority of legislative seats. The resulting variables are:
Single-Party Government: the government includes only the president's party. This variable includes majority and minority single-party governments.
Surplus coalitions: together the governing parties hold a majority of seats in the legislature and the exit of any one of the president's coalition partners would not jeopardize the government's majority status;
Minimum Winning Coalitions: The president's party does not hold a majority of seats but the governing coalition does. However, the exit of any coalition partner would leave the president without a legislative majority; 20 In order to check the robustness of the results, I ran several parametric specifications of the models presented below. Tests based on the log likelihood indicated that the most appropriate alternatives were the Weibull and exponential distributions which indicate flat and increasing hazards, respectively. In every case, results were unchanged (substantively or significantly). The closeness in results is an indicator that the specification of duration dependence is not driving the results. Results of these tests are available by request.
Minority Coalitions:
The president does not hold a majority of seats and neither do all the parties in the governing coalition together;
I measure institutional leverage with an indicator that gives a score of 1 to presidents who have the ability to issue decrees that immediately become law and a score of 0 to countries where this institutional power is not available to presidents (Decree). Although weaker forms of decree authority exist, this powerful unilateral authority should strongly shape the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties. Countries were this institutional power exists are Argentina after 1994, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. To capture the costs and benefits to parties of forming part of the government I use presidential approval. Parties should care about their electoral prospects and these should be closely linked to the president's public support (Approval). Data on presidential approval across a wide cross-section of countries is hard to come by, however. Here I use new data on executive approval compiled by Carlin et al (2009 The last set of variables measure the complexity of the bargaining environment. I follow Warwick (1993) in measuring the ideological compactness of the cabinet by coding the ideology of each party on a left (1) to right (5) scale and then using the share of legislative seats for each party as weighs. I then calculate the variance in these values using the standard deviation (SD). 24 This variable (Ideo Compact) ranges from 0 for single-party governments or coalitions with no ideological diversity to 1.48 for the most ideological diverse coalitions, with a mean of .28.
The measure of party discipline is taken from Martinez-Gallardo and Schleiter (2010) and reflects the extent to which electoral and party rules give legislators incentives to cultivate a personal or a party vote. We should expect stronger party discipline where there are fewer incentives to cultivate a personal vote, so in the analysis below I reverse the scale so that higher values indicate higher levels of party discipline. The reversed scale (Discipline) goes from .20 (low levels of party discipline) to .96 (high party discipline) with a mean value of .67. To measure the level of legislative fragmentation I use the Herfindahl index which gives the probability that two randomly selected legislators will belong to different parties. In the empirical analysis below I reverse the index so that higher values represent a higher level of fractionalization. The reversed index (Fractionalization) varies from .42 to .91, with a mean of .67.
24 Party ideology codings are based on Coppedge (1997) and other country-specific sources.
Finally, I have argued that unexpected events throughout a president's term are likely to change the terms under which the cabinet was formed. These events are (by definition) hard to model ex ante and they include events as diverse as a midterm election, a corruption scandal, or an economic crisis. In the empirical analysis I include controls that are meant to capture two important sources of shocks, economic shocks and electoral shocks. For the first I use the quarterly change in the consumer price index (Inflation). For electoral shocks I use a dummy for the three months before any legislative election (Time to Election).
Results
To recap, the central expectation of the theory is that governments will last longer when the cost to presidents of losing the support of coalition partners is higher. In particular, I have argued that strong presidents will have weaker incentives to reach agreement with coalition partners and so the likelihood of a bargaining failure will be higher. The results provide strong evidence for this hypothesis. Additionally, the data show that cabinets will be more stable when the president's authority is counterbalanced by an effective legislature and when the benefit to opposition parties of staying in the government outweighs the cost of being associated with the president.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 2 . Model 1 includes all the independent variables described above, except ideological diversity which is highly collinear with indicators of government status. 25 The interpretation of the results that follows is based on this model unless otherwise noted. Model 2 tests the importance of presidential approval for the reduced sample for which the data is available. The last model in the table tests arguments about the bargaining environment. Parameter estimates are expressed as unstandardized coefficients and must be interpreted in relation to the baseline hazard rate. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that an increase in the corresponding independent variable leads to an increase (decrease) in the likelihood that we will observe a cabinet failure. Table 2 here**
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The main conclusion to draw from Table 2 is that, as expected, stronger presidential authority is associated with a higher likelihood that the cabinet will be dissolved. Presidents with strong decree powers have fewer incentives to compromise and so the cabinets that they lead are more likely to end with a bargaining failure. However, this effect is offset by the capacity of a more effective legislature to revise and amend the president's proposals. Model 1 indicates that the direct effect of decree powers on the likelihood of a cabinet failure is very large; where the legislature scores zero on effectiveness, strong veto powers increase the odds of a failure more than 8 times.
However, this effect becomes smaller as the legislature's effectiveness increases. For presidents with decree powers, an increase of one SD (.78) in the legislature's effectiveness cuts the risk of a cabinet failure by half. In short, as the legislature becomes more important in policymaking, coalition building becomes more valuable for the president and cabinet failures become more unlikely. Further, even in the absence of decree powers, legislative effectiveness has a direct effect on cabinet stability, providing presidents with strong incentives for coalition building. The models in Table 2 also show that, as expected, coalition governments are substantially more unstable than single-party governments and that, among coalitions, surplus governments face the lowest cost of defection and the highest risk of dissolution. Controlling for the size of the president's party in the legislature, surplus governments are nearly 3 times as likely to end in a cabinet failure as minimum winning or minority coalitions (the baseline categories). However, although minority and minimum winning coalitions are more stable than surplus governments, they are not significantly different from each other. This supports Grofman's (1989) argument that the relationship between minimal winning status and coalition stability in parliamentary regimes is an artifact of the durability of cabinets in political systems with two dominant parties and the low duration of cabinets in countries where there is a larger number of parties.
this result provides strong initial evidence that parties are more likely to leave the government when they perceive their association with the president might hurt their electoral prospects.
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Arguments about the importance of the bargaining environment are also supported by the data, although to interpret the results we have to take into account the high correlation between the characteristics of the bargaining environment and measures of government status and presidential authority. Regarding the cost of agreement in the legislature, Model 1 shows that legislative fractionalization shapes coalition stability beyond its effect on government formation. To be sure, the coefficient in Model 3, which excludes government status, shows that fractionalization has a strong, indirect effect on coalition stability through its effect on the probability that a coalition will be formed. But the results indicate that even controlling for the president's majority and the government's status, an increase in one SD in the level of fractionalization increases the likelihood of dissolution by 33%. This suggests that besides its effect on government formation, legislative fractionalization also makes party defections less costly for the president who has access to more alternative coalition partners.
The cost of agreement within political parties is also important for coalition stability; an increase of one SD in party discipline leads to a reduction of nearly 40% in the risk of coalition dissolution. As others have noted before, however, decree powers and party discipline tend to move together (see Negretto 2004 and Limongi 2000) and the appendix shows that the effect of party discipline on coalition stability is even larger if decree powers are excluded. 28 Finally, I
have suggested that the costs of reaching agreements should also depend on the number of actors in the cabinet and on their ideological proximity. Results show that coalition governments with more 27 Table A .3 in the appendix shows an analysis of missing cases. Missing-ness is less likely in places with high levels of fractionalization, countries with high decree powers, and where the legislature is more effective. 28 In Table A .3 I replace the indicator for decree powers (correlated with discipline at p=.56) with the UNDP measure of presidential powers (correlated with discipline at p=.12).
parties are in fact more unstable, 29 but it is hard to measure the impact of ideological compactness independent from government status because cabinets with more parties are also more likely to be ideologically diverse. While ideological diversity is not significant if government status is taken into account (Model 1), it significantly increases the risk of dissolution if government status variables are excluded (Model 3). This indicates that, as Warwick (1992) suggests, the instability associated with coalition governments in presidential systems is related both to the number of parties in the cabinet and to their ideological diversity.
The control variables work largely in the expected direction. While changes in inflation have no effect on the likelihood of a defection, the dummy for the 3 months before a legislative election indicates that bargaining failures are 11% more likely in these months, as presidents and parties adjust their expectations to changing political conditions.
Conclusions
Coalitions are the most common form of government in the presidential countries of Latin coalitions. In the context of a trend in the region towards greater delegation of authority in the hands of executives, these results do not bode well for coalition maintenance and stability going forward.
Further, this article also suggests that party discipline is important for cabinet stability. As Javier Finally, this paper also contributes to the discussion about the similarities and differences between with parliamentary and presidential democracies by showing that, despite lack of a survival relationship, coalition building in presidentialism reflects party system diversity and helps presidents deal with the challenges of policymaking, much in the same way that it does in parliamentary countries. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
